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VOLUME 59

A TRIBUTE

NUMBER 4

TO CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES R. ZAZZALI:

MORE THAN A "CARETAKER"

Gregory L. Acquaviva,* JonathanL. Marshfield,#
and David M. Stauss^
I do envision going beyond being a mere caretaker. As
challenges come along, I will not linger in the valleys, but would
hope that we could climb a few more mountains.1

*
Associate, Latham & Watkins LLP, New York. J.D., Seton Hall University
School of Law, 2006.
# Associate, Saul Ewing LLP, New Jersey. J.D., Rutgers University School of
Law-Camden, 2006.
^ Associate, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, New Jersey. J.D., Rutgers
University School of Law-Camden, 2005. The authors served as law clerks to the
Honorable James R. Zazzali.
1. Chief Justice-nominee James R. Zazzali delivered those words at a press
conference announcing his nomination to the high court's top post. Josh Margolin,
Corzine Taps Two for Top Court, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 22, 2006, at 16.
When Governor Jon Corzine nominated then-Associate Justice Zazzali as the
seventh Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the New Jersey Law
Journal labeled Zazzali's imminent tenure as a "caretaker term." Michael Booth,
Zazzali, Named Chief Justice, Says He's a Realist About Caretaker Term, N.J.L.J.,
Sept. 25, 2006, at 1. Accepting the nomination, Chief Justice-nominee Zazzali
recognized as much: "Yes, I am a realist, and how much we can do in a year remains to
be seen.... [But] I do envision going beyond being a mere caretaker." Margolin, supra.
That goal became a reality. On his retirement, his predecessor, Chief Justice
Deborah Poritz, said, "He leaves behind a substantial legacy. He was not a caretaker;
he really tried to continue the work that made the court system really good." Kate
Coscarelli, His 8-Month Run Was One Mad Dash, STAR-LEDGER, June 17, 2007, at 1.
Chief Justice Zazzali is now of counsel to Gibbons P.C. and Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak,
Kleinbaum & Friedman, both of Newark, New Jersey.
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On June 1.7, 2007, Chief Justice James R. Zazzali turned
seventy, the mandatory retirement age for judges in the State of New
Jersey.2 That birthday brought to an end a seven-year tenure on the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, capped by an abbreviated nine-month
stint as chief justice.3 Beyond those contributions, however, the
Chief's birthday capped a life-long commitment to public service and
to New Jersey. His near half-century legal career personifies a
diversity of virtues and provides a compelling narrative. An adored
father and husband,4 a respected jurist, and a celebrated guardian of
the vulnerable, Chief Justice Zazzali stepped down from the bench as
one of New Jersey's most respected and beloved public servants.
Although Chief Justice Zazzali's tenure on the Court and tenure
as chief justice were short, his impact on New Jersey civil law was
nonetheless significant. This Tribute examines that impact and seeks
to pay tribute to both the man and his jurisprudence, by highlighting
the Chief Justice's important opinions in the civil law context. His
clear and accessible opinions5 consistently protected the state's
children from myriad harms including negligent educators, harassing
classmates, and tortfeasing businesses.6 In the area of tort law, Chief
Justice Zazzali was willing to incrementally expand the common law
to account for evolving norms and provide injured plaintiffs with
avenues for redress when appropriate.7 In addition, when addressing
worker's rights, Chief Justice Zazzali, the son of a labor lawyer and a
labor lawyer himself, never forgot the plight of the employee. Finally,
in the corporate law context, the Chief Justice, in a practical fashion,
generally sought to level the playing field for aggrieved investors,
consumers, and property owners seeking redress against corporate
entities and municipalities.8 In short, Chief Justice Zazzali's civil
jurisprudence reflects his sympathy for the "little guy."

2. See Coscarelli, supranote 1.
3. Id.
4. Although this Tribute necessarily focuses on the Chiefs accomplishments
during his legal career, those who know him undoubtedly know that he considers his
greatest accomplishment to be his family, including his wife Eileen, their five children,
and two grandchildren. In the past, the Chief often has noted that his
accomplishments have been due to the love and support of his family.
5. According to former Associate Justice Peter Verniero, the Chief Justice's
"clearly written opinions were 'the hallmark of an outstanding judge."' Mary Pat
Gallagher, Zazzali Leaves Office in a Final Blaze of Rulings, N.J.L.J., June 18, 2007,
at 19.
6. See infra notes 81-126 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 127-72 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 242-311 and accompanying text.
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Chief Justice Zazzali was born in Newark, New Jersey in 1937.9
His parents, Andrew F. Zazzali and Aida Taverni, were both of
Italian descent and the Chief traces his roots to Tuscany.10 As a
child, the Chief Justice struggled with asthma."1 Indeed, Chief
Justice Zazzali experienced severe asthma attacks, awaking during
the night unable to breathe. With limited treatments available, his
parents were often able to do little more than wait for the attacks to
subside and considered a move to Arizona. Because of his condition,
he

was

sidelined

from

many

traditional

boyhood

activities,12

spending much of his "young life reading, building model ships and
following politics . . . ."13 The asthma persisted through his collegiate
and law school days, where he was frequently incapacitated and
forced to self-administer a primitive pump to assist his breathing.
The Chief Justice's experiences with asthma forced him to confront
his own vulnerability and perhaps contributed to the keen awareness
of the needs of the underprivileged that characterize his legal and
judicial career.
Another of the Chiefs shaping experiences was the early death
of his aunt and uncle, who worked in a Newark sweatshop and died
of pneumonia.14 Although the family rarely discussed the tragedy,15
the Chief Justice referenced the event as a significant factor in his
decision to practice labor law, and the deaths reinforced his father's
16
interest in representing workers, himself a labor attorney.
Despite those childhood struggles and traumas, the Chief Justice
successfully graduated from Seton Hall Preparatory School in South
Orange,17 which, together with the example of his parents, he credits

9. Alison Herget, Zazzali Lauds New Jersey JudicialSystem, ASBURY PARK PRESS
(Neptune, N.J.), Feb. 9, 2007.
10. James Zazzali to Lead New Jersey's Top Court, ITALIAN TRIB. (Montclair, N.J.),
Nov. 23, 2006, at 1. More specifically, the Chief Justice's paternal grandparents
resided in the mountains of Northern Italy before eventually immigrating to America
via France, while his maternal grandparents were from the hills of Tuscany. Id.
11. Ovetta Wiggins, An Opportunity to 'Do Good; Distinguished Lawyer Takes
Oath as Justice Today, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), June 20, 2000, at A3
(discussing Chief Justice's childhood struggles with asthma).
12. Id.
13. Kate Coscarelli, Top Justice In Brief: Modest and Warm, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Nov. 9, 2006, at 21.
14. See James Zazzali to Lead New Jersey's Top Court, supra note 10.
15. Id.
16. See id.; see also Coscarelli, supra note 13.
17. Wiggins, supra note 11.
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for his strong moral compass. Following in his father's footsteps,18
the Chief Justice graduated from Georgetown University in 1958 and
the Georgetown Law Center in 1962.19 After graduation, Chief
Justice Zazzali turned down opportunities to enter private practice,
opting instead to become involved in the labor movement.20 He joined
the Eastern Conference of Teamsters and traveled throughout the
Carolinas, Georgia, Virginia, and West Virginia helping to organize
workers.21 It was a challenging yet rewarding endeavor as the labor
effort was closely aligned with the developing civil rights
movement. 22 The poverty and civil unrest that Chief Justice Zazzali
witnessed profoundly impacted him.23 In his own words, "It was a
formative period for a number of reasons. I began to see, to really see,
what it means to be truly poor and powerless in this country. It was

an awakening."24 Nevertheless, he was inspired by the experience: "It
occurred to me that public service [provides an opportunity,] not to
remake the world, but to, in an incremental way, make things
better."25
After working with the Teamsters for two years, 26 the Chief
Justice moved back to New Jersey, accepting a clerkship with New
Jersey Superior Court Judge Lawrence A. Whipple.27 After his

18. Andrew Zazzali attended Georgetown University where, as an undergrad, he
captained the school's basketball and baseball teams. See Georgetown Basketball
History: The Top 100, Andrew Zazzali, http://www.hoyabasketball.com/features/
top100/a zazzali.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2007). After college, the Chief Justice's
father graduated from Georgetown Law Center and became a prominent labor
attorney. See James Zazzali to Lead New Jersey's Top Court, supra note 10. In the
early 1950s, President Harry Truman appointed Andrew Zazzali as Director of the
Office of Price Stabilization during the Korean War.
19. James Zazzali to Lead New Jersey's Top Court, supra note 10.
20. Coscarelli, supra note 13.
21. James R. Zazzali, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New Jersey,
Commencement Address at Rutgers University School of Law-Newark (May 25, 2007),
in N.J.L.J., June 4, 2007, at 17.
22. Id.; see also Frank Askin, Op-Ed., Zazzali: Watchdog for the Little Guy, THE
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Sept. 26, 2006 ("Most of [the Chiefs] activities with
unorganized workers [were] closely related to the budding civil rights movement
there.").
23. Zazzali, supra note 21, at 17.
24. Id. The Chief has also commented that his salary during that period was
$5000, "which, even in those days, was not a princely sum." Id.
25. James Zazzali to Lead New Jersey's Top Court, supra note 10; Coscarelli, supra
note 13.
26. Askin, supra note 22.
27. In 1967, Judge Whipple was appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. See Lawrence A. Whipple
Attorney Conference Room, http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/atty/nwkConference.html
(last visited June 29, 2007). It was in Judge Whipple's chambers that the Chief met
Priscilla Roth, who would later admirably serve as the Chiefs secretary during his
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clerkship in 1965, and at Judge Whipple's insistence,28 Chief Justice
Zazzali took a position in the Essex County prosecutor's office, where
he tried thirty jury trials in his first year, and went on to argue
approximately 120 cases before New Jersey's Appellate Division and
Supreme Court throughout his career. 29 That experience proved to be
one of the most fortuitous in the Chiefs career because the thenEssex County prosecutor was Brendan T. Byrne,30 who would later
be elected Governor.31 After serving as a prosecutor, the Chief Justice
entered private practice, joining the labor firm that his father
founded, Zazzali, Fagella, & Nowak.32 He also served as an associate
editor of the New Jersey Law Journal33 and maintained his
dedication to public service by serving as general counsel, with his
brother, to the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority from
1974 to 1982.34
Zazzali's most high profile opportunity came in 1981, when
Governor Byrne appointed him to serve as attorney general.35 His
term as Attorney General bears many similarities to his tenure as
chief justice. He was appointed as attorney general during the
waning months of Governor Byrne's second term and served for only

tenure on the Court. Those of us law clerks who have had the privilege of working with
Priscilla can attest to her importance to the Chiefs tenure on the Court.
28. Wiggins, supra note 11.
29. The Chief served as an assistant Essex County prosecutor from 1965 to 1968.
He began in the trial division but was eventually named the Chief of the Appellate
Division. See Successor to Degnan Nominated by Byrne, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1981, at
B2; see also Wiggins, supra note 11. The Chief argued several cases before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. The Chief Justice argued before the United States
Supreme Court in 1983. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
30. Byrne was appointed Deputy Attorney General to serve as Essex County
prosecutor on February 16, 1959. See Donald A. D'Onofrio, Inventory of the Papers of
Brendan T. Byrne, http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/ead/manuscripts/brendanbyrnef.html
(last visited June 29, 2007) (providing timeline of Byrne's career). With his
characteristic humor, Chief Justice Zazzali often tells the story that when he
interviewed for the position, Byrne spent the interview shining his shoes, finally
looking up and saying to Zazzali, "It'll be a risk, but you're hired." Byrne and Zazzali's
friendship lasts to this day. Decades after Zazzali's hiring, Governor Byrne spoke at
Chief Justice Zazzali's swearing in as chief justice, at one point joking that he would
keep his remarks short so that Chief Justice Zazzali's tenure would not be over by the
time the ceremony concluded.
31. Id.
32. Wiggins, supra note 11.
33. N.J. Attorney General Named, BOND BUYER (New York, N.Y.), Mar. 12, 1981,
at 3.
34. Id.
35. Id. Notably, Chief Justice Zazzali was appointed to various positions within the
State of New Jersey by five governors-both Democrats and Republicans.
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ten months.36 As would be the case when he was named chief justice,
his term as attorney general was initially labeled a "caretaker" term
because of its brevity.37 However, the Chief Justice approached his
responsibilities with his characteristic assiduousness, making several
significant contributions during his tenure.
When Zazzali became attorney general, he announced that he
would make street and gang crime, and the nascent casino industry,
his priorities. Illustratively, one of his first initiatives was the
oversight of the state's then-fledgling gaming industry. In a
controversial move, the then-attorney general adamantly opposed the
issuance of a gaming permit for the Claridge casino.3s The casino's
operator, Del E. Webb Corporation, was then under federal
indictment for criminal conspiracy to defraud an investor relating to
its Nevada gaming activities. 39 Zazzali asserted that, in view of the
federal investigation, to permit Webb to operate a New Jersey casino,
even temporarily, "would seriously undermine the public's confidence
in the regulatory process and would signal a retreat from every
promise of integrity contained in the casino statute."40 That stance
was admirable given the countervailing pressures to grow the state's
emerging gaming industry. Ultimately, Webb sought to sell its
interest in the proposed casino because of the likelihood that the
Casino Control Commission would adopt Zazzali's recommendation.41
In addition, and perhaps affected by his family's past and
informed by his labor movement experience, then-Attorney General
Zazzali established a task force to enforce the state's labor laws.42 In
particular, he cited the proliferation of "apparel industry sweatshops"
in northeastern New Jersey as the impetus for the task force's
creation.43 Later commenting on the task force and the problems
associated with sweatshops, Chief Justice Zazzali said, "I thought

36. See Joseph F. Sullivan, Jersey Politics Keyed to a Lame-Duck Governor and
Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1981, at B2. The attorney general position became
available because Attorney General John J. Degnan resigned to seek the Democratic
nomination for governor. Id.
37. See Pat Read, Attorney General Battles Obscurity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1981, at
NJ-1 (quoting Chief Justice Zazzali as saying that he refuses to be simply a
"caretaker").
38. See Donald Janson, Jersey Opposes Casino License for Webb Corp, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 1981, at B2.
39. Id. The underlying basis for the federal indictment against Webb was that the
company defrauded a Teamster pension fund of $1 million. See Richard Levine &
Carlyle C. Douglas, Webb Deals Itself Out of New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1981, at
E-6.
40. Janson, supra note 38 (quoting Attorney General James R. Zazzali).
41. Levine & Douglas, supra note 39.
42. See Jersey Opens Drive on Sweat Shops, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1981, at B2.
43. Id.
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those battles had been fought and won before I was born. But I was
wrong."44
The Chief tackled other difficult and important issues as
attorney general, many of which transcended the traditional scope of
law enforcement. Zazzali convened a committee to investigate, for the
first time, the extent of drug and alcohol use among New Jersey
students.45 He also chaired the "Superfund Committee" that studied
the most efficient means of compensating victims of toxic waste
dumping,46 emphasized reform within the state's motor vehicle
agency, 47 and recommended various changes regarding the
regulation of solid waste disposal.48 Most significant, however, the
Chief Justice was an instrumental ally in the push to raise New
Jersey's drinking age from eighteen to twenty-one,49 which occurred
in 1982 after he issued a report in favor of the change.50
Zazzali's tenure as attorney general concluded with his
supervisory role in the tumultuous 1981 gubernatorial election. The
dead heat election pitted Thomas H. Kean against James J. Florio
and was, at the time, "the closest gubernatorial race in the state's
history."51 The initial tallies suggested that Kean had won by
approximately 1000 votes. 52 Conscious of the impending controversy,
Governor Byrne ordered his attorney general to impound "all voting
machines and absentee ballots" and place them under twenty-four
hour police guard.53 Predictably, Florio requested a recount, which
Zazzali, as attorney general, enforced.54 Ultimately, after a highly

44. See Read, supra note 37, at NJ-15.
According to the 1981 Annual Report of the New Jersey Department of Law and
Public Safety, the interdepartmental task force concentrated on minimum wage and
overtime violations, the proliferation of illegal industrial homework, and substandard
health and safety conditions. N.J. DEP'T OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, 1981 ANNUAL
REPORT 4 [hereinafter 1981 ANNUAL REPORT].
45.

1981 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 2.

46. Id. at 3.
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 3.
49. See Michael Norman, Effort to Raise Drinking Age in New Jersey Unites
Diverse Group, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1982, at B1.
50. Id.
51.

Elizabeth Wharton, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 4, 1981.

52.

Pamela Brownstein, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 5, 1981.

53. Jim Manion, No Major Change in Vote PatternAs Recount Begins, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 19, 1981. One reporter observed that "[t]he state appears under martial
law. Armed state troopers stand guard round-the-clock." Pamela Brownstein, UNITED
PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 7, 1981.

54.

Jim Manion, Recount of Close Governor'sRace Begins Wednesday, ASSOCIATED

PRESS, Nov. 17, 1981.
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scrutinized, week-long recount, 55 Florio conceded defeat to Kean.56
Leaders of both political parties acknowledged the "objective and
neutral manner in which" the attorney general's office conducted the
57
recount.
Following a successful,58 albeit abbreviated, term as attorney
general, Zazzali reentered private practice, assuming several
ancillary public service positions, including fifteen years of service on
the Disciplinary Review Board and ten years on the State
Commission of Investigation.59 But, nearly two decades later, he was
nominated as an associate justice to the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in 2000 by Governor Christine Todd Whitman6O and was
enthusiastically confirmed by the Senate.61
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of his appointment to the
Court was its personal significance. At his swearing-in ceremony,
then-Justice Zazzali recounted the story of how his father almost
received a federal judgeship.62 According to the Chief, in 1950
President Harry S. Truman "was on the verge of nominating his
father to the federal court in New Jersey."63 However, various
''political powers" in the state endorsed another candidate and,
according to the Chief, "[t]hey were frantic because they could not
identify and thus could not neutralize" his father's support. 64 One
day, when the Chief was about twelve, he answered a phone call from

55. See Robert Hanley, Jersey Election Recount Starts in all 21 Counties, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1981, at B1.
56. Jim Manion, Florio Concedes to Kean for New Jersey Governor, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 30, 1981.
57. 1981 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 1.
58. Indeed, Zazzali's success as attorney general prompted rumors of a campaign
for the United States Senate. Joseph F. Sullivan, Returning to Private Life: A Jarring
Trip, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1982, at 4.
59. Governor Kean appointed Chief Justice Zazzali to be chairman of the New
Jersey State Investigation Commission. See Wiggins, supra note 11. There, he
investigated, among other areas, the check cashing industry, the boxing business, solid
waste regulations, local government corruption, and organized crime. See Kathy
Carter, Ex-AG Nominated to Top Court-Zazzali, a Democrat, Praised by Both Sides,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), May 26, 2000, at 3.
Zazzali also was appointed by the United Stated District Court of New Jersey as
special master for the county jails in Essex, Monmouth, and Bergen counties and
served as vice-chairman of the Disciplinary Review Board. Askin, supra note 22, at 1.
60. Carter, supra note 59, at 1.
61. Ovetta Wiggins, Senate Unanimously Approves Zazzali for Seat on High Court,
THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), May 26, 2000, at A3.
62. Kathy Carter, Zazzali Joins Supreme Court with a Feeling of Redemption,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 21, 2000.
63. Id.
64. Sherry Conohan, Just Rewards for Dad, Son: New top court justice recalls 50year-old injustice, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Neptune, N.J.), June 21, 2000.
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a reporter and, being "proud of [his] Dad's support," he revealed all
that he knew about his father's backers.65 That misstep resulted in a
front-page story that may have cost his father the judgeship.66 In
ascending to New Jersey's high court, Justice Zazzali expressed hope
of redemption for his childhood mistake.67
After serving as an associate justice for six years, the Chief
found himself in a fortuitous position. Because the New Jersey
Constitution requires judges to retire at age seventy,68 Chief Justice
Poritz, a Republican, was destined to retire in October 2006.
However, in keeping with the state's tradition that no more than four
justices be from one political party, 69 Governor Jon Corzine, a
Democrat, could not replace Chief Justice Poritz with a Democrat.70
Rather than nominate a Republican chief justice, Governor Corzine
opted to elevate Justice Zazzali, who would himself reach mandatory
retirement in June 2007, and nominated a Republican associate
justice, Helen Hoens.71 That approach enabled Governor Corzine to
make a long-term, Democratic chief justice appointment upon Chief
Justice Zazzali's retirement, namely, Stuart Rabner, whose term as
chief justice may last for nearly a quarter century.72
The circumstances of the Chiefs elevation led many to
characterize Chief Justice Zazzali, once again, as a "caretaker."73
However, the Chief approached his new responsibilities with
characteristic vigor and commitment, securing a legacy as chief

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § VI, para. 3; see also Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 735 (2003) (discussing New
Jersey's mandatory retirement provision).
69. John B. Wefing, Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes and His Contributionsto the
Judiciary of New Jersey, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1257, 1261 (2006) (discussing the
Court's tradition of "bipartisan division").
70. At the time, the Court consisted of four democrats-Justices Virginia Long,
Zazzali, John Wallace, and Barry Albin. Chief Justice Poritz and Associate Justice
Roberto Rivera-Soto were Republicans and Justice Jaynee LaVecchia was an
independent. See Robert Seidenstein, Call Him Chief, N.J. LAWYER, Sept. 25, 2006, at
1 (discussing political configuration of the Court and Governor Corzine's elevation of
Justice Zazzali).
71. Id.
72. Id. If reconfirmed, Chief Justice Rabner could serve as New Jersey's top judge
for twenty-four years, surpassing Chief Justice Robert Wilentz's seventeen-year tenure
as the longest in New Jersey Supreme Court history. Lisa Brennan, Corzine Makes a
Legacy Appointment, N.J.L.J., June 4, 2007, at 1.
73. Robert Seidenstein, Chief Justice Zazzali: The Court's Happy Warrior, N.J.
LAWYER, May 28, 2007, at 1.
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justice on par with those of his distinguished predecessors.74 As the
judiciary's chief administrator, Chief Justice Zazzali obtained a
judicial pay increase-the first of its kind in eight years. 75
Characterizing the issue as a "constitutional crisis" and emphasizing
that judges were leaving the bench because of a growing disparity
between judicial salaries and private sector compensation,76 the
Chief Justice won the support of both the Governor and the
Legislature.77
Additionally, the Chiefs tenure had a disproportionate, positive
impact on judicial morale. Aside from the obvious goodwill that the
salary increase garnered, the Chief personally visited all fifteen of
the state's judicial vicinages.78 Without pretense or ceremony, the
Chief Justice met with judges to "touch base" and get a feel for the
state of the judiciary.79 The pay off for the Chief Justice was
immediate, with judges across the state endeared by the Chiefs
interest in their circumstances and appreciation for their service.80
The Chief also made significant contributions to New Jersey's
substantive law. By our count, during his short tenure as Chief
Justice and six-year term as Associate Justice, he authored over
ninety majority opinions and just over two dozen concurrences and
dissents. It is to those opinions and the Chiefs contributions to the
State's civil law that we now turn.

II. PROTECTION OF CHILDREN
In seven years on the Supreme Court, Justice Zazzali's largest
jurisprudential impact may be his efforts to protect children"those... in the dawn of life"s1-from harms including negligent

74. See Askin, supra note 22 ("James R. Zazzali is an appropriate and deserving
addition to along [sic] list of distinguished New Jersey Chief Justices: Arthur
Vanderbilt, Joseph Weintraub, Richard J. Hughes, Robert Wilentz, and Deborah
Poritz.").
75. ShortchangingJudges, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, at 14NJ.
76. See Jason Method, Judicial Salary Called Subpar, ASBURY PARK PRESS
(Neptune, N.J.), Feb. 16, 2007 (quoting Chief Justice Zazzali as saying, "I think it's
reached a constitutional crisis. We have good judges who have left, are thinking of
leaving, or will leave and have already put a date on it").
77. Numerous editorial boards supported the judicial pay increase. See, e.g.,
Editorial, Judicial Compensation: Enabling the New Jersey Judiciary, N.J. LAWYER,
Mar. 12, 2007, at 6.
78. Coscarelli, supra note 1, at 15.
79. See Robert G. Seidenstein, Knock, Knock: W~ho's There? The Chief Justice, N.J.
LAWYER, Feb. 12, 2007, at 1.
80. See Coscarelli, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting one judge as saying, "It was just so
meaningful to all of us, on a personal level, because of his warmth and sincerity").
81. Hubert Humphrey observed: "[Tihe moral test of government is how that
government treats those who are in the dawn of life, the children; those who are in the
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schools, harassing peers, unfit parents, and corporate tortfeasors. His
predilection for ensuring child safety in myriad environments and
circumstances is most evident in his final two years on the Court.82
In his final majority opinion, Jerkins v. Anderson,83 Chief Justice
Zazzali and a unanimous Court "reaffirmed... the strong state
interest in protecting children,"84 and held that a school's duty of
reasonable care "does not summarily disappear when the school bell
rings," but, rather, continues throughout dismissal.85 In Jerkins, a
nine-year-old boy was struck by a car following an early dismissal
from school, and subsequently was paralyzed from the neck down.86
The child and his family alleged that the school district breached its
duty of reasonable supervision with respect to the child's dismissal
that day and did not adequately apprise the parents of the scheduled
early dismissal.87 In finding that schools must act, under the totality
of the circumstances,88 as a reasonable educator in like

twilight of life, the elderly; and those who are in the shadows of life-the sick, the
needy and the handicapped." RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
REQUESTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 142 (Suzy Platt ed. 1989).

Chief Justice Zazzali referenced Humphrey's words during his formal swearing-in
ceremony and, at retirement, said, "Our children are the state's most important
assets." Coscarelli, supra note 1, at 15.
82. In addition to the cases addressed herein, Chief Justice Zazzali protected the
"best interest of the child" in an opinion issued in his final week on the Court,
MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 929 A.2d 1252 (N.J. 2007). There, the Court permitted a
Japanese citizen and United States national to remove her child to Japan despite the
protestations of the child's father. Id. at 1261-62. The Court agreed with the trial
court's finding that relocation to Japan served the child's best interests. Id.
That willingness to protect children extended beyond his jurisprudence. For
example, in cooperation with the Division of Youth and Family Services, Chief Justice
Zazzali formed a joint task force to address the needs of children victimized by
domestic violence. See Zazzali: Initiatives and Successes, N.J. LAWYER, May 21, 2007,
at 6 (text of "State of Judiciary" Speech). "We need to help the children who are living
in these troubled homes and I am quite hopeful that the task force sets us on the right
path toward solutions." Id.
83. 922 A.2d 1279 (N.J. 2007).
84. Kate Coscarelli, Schools' Duty to GuardKids Doesn't End at Last Period,STARLEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 15, 2007, at 1.
85. Id. A school's duty of reasonable care extends beyond the classroom, to
lunchtime and activities occurring on school grounds prior to the start of the school
day. See id. Labeled as a reasonable decision by the New Jersey School Boards
Association, commentators recognized that Jerkins's impact may be far reaching.
Coscarelli, supra note 84.
86. Jerkins, 922 A.2d at 1281.
87. Id. at 1281-83.
88. According to the New Jersey State Bar Association's School Law Committee,
school districts "may take comfort in the Court's adoption of a totality-of-thecircumstances standard." Charles Toutant, School May be Liable for Exercising Poor
Supervision DuringDismissal, N.J.L.J., June 18, 2007, at 13.
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circumstances would,89 the Court found that such a duty may
generally be discharged by: (1) adoption of a reasonable policy
concerning dismissal; (2) provision of adequate notice of that policy to
parents or guardians; and (3) effective implementation of that policy,
including adherence to the reasonable requests of parents regarding
dismissal.90
Opinions regarding the safety of school children served as
bookends to Chief Justice Zazzali's tenure as head of the courts. In
his first and, according to at least one commentator, his "signature"91
opinion as Chief Justice, L. W. v. Toms River Regional Schools Board
of Education,92 the Court established a right to recovery against a
school district for victims of student-on-student sexual or affectional
orientation
harassment
under
the
state's
Law
Against
Discrimination.93 Beginning in the fourth grade, plaintiff L.W., who
was perceived by his peers as being a homosexual, was subjected to
incessant verbal abuse, sexual molestation, and physical violence.94
The Court held that to recover, plaintiffs such as L.W. must prove
that the school district, with actual or constructive notice of the
severe or pervasive harassment, failed to take measures "reasonably
calculated to end" the offensive conduct.95 That practical standard
mirrors the standard applicable to hostile work environment
allegations,96 a recognition that "[s]tudents in the classroom are
entitled to no less protection from unlawful discrimination and

89. Id. at 1288.
90. Id. The Court tempered its ruling, noting that the imposition of a duty on
educators "does not diminish the responsibilities that parents or guardians have to
their children." Id. at 1291.
Four months after the court's "landmark" ruling in Jerkins, the Pleasantville Board
of Education and the Jerkins family settled their dispute for $6 million. School to Pay
$6M in Case of Boy Hit by CarAfter Early Dismissal, N.J.L.J., Oct. 29, 2007, at 9.
91. Editorial, The Chief's ProudRecord, N.J.L.J., June 8, 2007, at 22. According to
the New Jersey Law Journal, L. W. embodied Chief Justice Zazzali's commitment to the
underprivileged. "The lawyer who began his career in 1962 working for labor unions in
the South never forgot the struggle for civil rights that he witnessed there." Id.
92. 915 A.2d 535 (N.J. 2007).
93. Id. at 547. The Court relied on the Law Against Discrimination's plain
language, the Law's broad remedial goal, and the pervasive nature of student-onstudent sexual harassment. Id.
94. Id. at 539-44.
95. Id. at 550. The Court distinguished, however, that "isolated schoolyard insults
or classroom taunts are not actionable." Id. at 547. Additionally, the Court rejected the
"deliberate indifference" standard, advanced by the defendant, as applicable to claims
filed under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, because Title IX is a
narrower remedial statute than the Law Against Discrimination. L.W., 915 A.2d at
549.
96. Lehmann v. Toys "R'Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 464 (N.J. 1993).
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harassment than their adult counterparts in the workplace."97 In
sum, although "[a] school cannot be expected to shelter students from
all instances of peer harassment[,] ... reasonable measures are
required to protect our youth, a duty that schools are more than
capable of performing."98
Civil rights organizations, including the American Civil Liberties
Union of New Jersey99 and Garden State Equality,100 as well as
commentators, hailed the unanimous opinion. Notably, in praising
the "landmark ruling," The New York Times editorial board wrote
that the opinion "changes the legal landscape in New Jersey," and
hoped that the opinion would herald the "start of a new national
approach to the problem [of anti-gay student bullying] ."101 Education
consultants concurred, proclaiming that Chief Justice Zazzali's "wellreasoned opinion.., should servel as a model for other states."102
In his last opinion as an associate justice,103 New Jersey Division
of Youth and Family Services v. M.M.,104 the Court held that one
parent's parental rights may be terminated if he or she is unable to
protect his or her child from danger created by the presence of the
other parent.10 5 The case involved a difficult domestic situation
where a mother's parental rights had previously been terminated
because of substance abuse and severe mental impairment, among
other things.106 However, the father continued to cohabitate with the

97. L.W., 915 A.2d at 549.
98. Id. at 550.
99. Rick Hepp, Schools Held Liable for Bullying of Students, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Feb. 22, 2007, at 1; see also John G. Geppert, Jr., No Tabula Rasa
Here, N.J.L.J., May 7, 2007, at 23 (observing that L.W. "has received wide-spread
acclaim").
100. Lauren 0. Kidd, Schools Must Stop Student Harassment,ASBURY PARK PRESS
(Neptune, N.J.), Feb. 22, 2007.
101. Editorial, Protecting All Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2007, at 14. "The
court's ruling ...sets a worthy standard for courts and educators nationwide." Id.
102. Amelia Carolla & Catherine Merino Reisman, A Model for Clamping Down on
Harassment in Schools, N.J.L.J., Mar. 16, 2007, at 23; see also George S. Anthony,
Focus on Students as Agents of Change to Confront Bullying, ASBURY PARK PRESS
(Neptune, N.J.), Feb. 25, 2007, at C3 (stating that L.W. "provides an opportunity to
seek sustainable solutions for our children at risk of bullying on a daily basis").
103. Although M.M. was filed on February 8, 2007-three months into Chief Justice
Zazzali's term as chief justice-the Supreme Court heard oral argument on October 11,
2006, fifteen days before Justice Zazzali's elevation. Therefore, the published opinion
is authored by "Justice," not "Chief Justice," Zazzali. The same anomaly occurred in
Hodges v. Sasil Corp., 915 A.2d 1 (N.J. 2007) (heard Sept. 25, 2006 and filed Jan. 31,
2007).
104. 914 A.2d 1265 (N.J. 2007).
105. Id. at 1269-70, 1278-79.
106. Id. at 1271-72.
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mother and frequently left the child alone with her.107 Because the
father could not provide adequate care or protection for his son, and
because he refused to maintain a residence separate from the
mother, the Court held that termination of his parental rights was in
the son's best interests.108 Although a close case, the evident concern
in Justice Zazzali's opinion was the best interests of the child in view
of all the circumstances, including the harmful presence of another
parent. 109
Justice Zazzali's penchant for protecting children was also
apparent in Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park.110 Referred to as "the
children's rights issue of 2005,"111 the dispute arose after a twelveyear-old fractured his femur while using a recreational skateboard
facility maintained by a Vans store.112 Prior to the child's use of the
facility, his mother signed a release requiring arbitration of disputes
and relinquishing the right to seek damages for injury "unless Vans
intentionally failed to prevent or correct a hazard caused by unsafe
equipment or devices."113 The Court was called on to determine
"whether a parent can bind a minor child to either a pre-injury
waiver of liability or an agreement to arbitrate."114
In respect of a parent's authority to release a minor child's latent
tort claims arising from the use of a commercial recreational facility,
the majority15 found that New Jersey's public policy prohibited
parents from waiving their child's potential claims.116 Justice Zazzali
analogized the question presented to New Jersey Court Rule 4:44,
107. Id. at 1272-78.
108. Id. at 1279-80. The Court's opinion received both praise and criticism. See
Margaret McHugh, Home Situation Outweighs Father's Rights, Say Justices, STARLEDGER (Newark, N.J.) Feb. 9, 2007, at 19. Child advocates hailed the opinion as "a
good decision for kids" because it considered all factors bearing on a child's well-being,
including the harmful presence of another parent. Id. However, public interest groups
expressed concern that the Court was infringing on constitutional parentage rights. Id.
Justices Wallace and Rivera-Soto dissented, arguing that the record did not sustain
the majority's conclusion that termination was in the child's best interests. M.M., 914
A.2d at 1285-86 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
109. See M.M., 914 A.2d at 1278-85 (majority opinion) (analyzing spectrum of
interests at issue).
110. 901 A.2d 381 (N.J. 2006).
111. Robert G. Seidenstein, Can Parents Sign Away Kids' Rights?, N.J. LAWYER,
Mar. 21, 2005, at 1.
112. Hojnowski, 901 A.2d at 384.
113. Id. at 383-84.
114. Id. at 383.
115. Seeking to uphold the waiver, Justice LaVecchia, joined by Justice Rivera-Soto,
dissented on the first question presented, whether a parent may waive access to the
courts, in lieu of arbitration, on behalf of a child. Id. at 395 (LaVecchia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
116. Id. at 386 (majority opinion).
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which prohibits a minor's parent from settling the child's personal
injury action without statutory or judicial approval17 and "guard[s] a
minor against an improvident compromise."118 According to the
Court, minors "deserve as much protection from the improvident
compromise of their rights before an injury occurs as Rule 4:44
affords them after the injury."119 Moreover, Justice Zazzali stated
that policies restricting a parent's right to release tortfeasors from
120
liability should apply with greater force in the preinjury context.
To be sure, a contrary result "would remove a significant incentive
for operators of commercial enterprises that attract children to take
reasonable precautions to protect their safety."21
On the second issue, the Court, paying homage to the strong
policies of enforcing arbitration agreements and encouraging
alternative dispute resolution, unanimously agreed that a parent's
preinjury agreement to arbitrate a child's tort claim is enforceable.122
The Court held that "allowing a parent to bind a minor child to
arbitrate is not contrary to our duty as parens patriae to protect the
best interests of the child."123 However, the majority's temperate
decision moved some commentators to chastise the Court's
sanctioning of arbitration agreements. 24 One critic proclaimed, "The
Court should not allow businesses to extinguish a citizen's right to a
jury trial simply because a form is signed by a customer."125

117. Id. at 387.
118. Id. (quoting Colfer v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 519 A.2d 893, 894 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986).
119. Id. (formatting omitted). According to commentators, the Court's holding on
preinjury liability waivers was "not a departure from settled law." Michael Booth,
Parents Can't Waive a Child's Suit Over Injuries But Can Limit Forum, N.J.L.J., July
24, 2006, at 7.
120. Hojnowski, 901 A.2d at 387.
121. Id. at 388. The majority rejected defendant's arguments. The Court was not
persuaded that: (1) a parent's decision to issue a preinjury release was no different
from a parent's decision not to bring suit on a minor's behalf; (2) a parental release of
liability implicated the parent's fundamental right to direct the child's upbringing; and
(3) enforcement of parental preinjury liability releases is necessary to ensure the
viability of businesses that offer activities to minors.
122. Id. at 391-92, 394.
123. Id. at 392.
124. Grayzel, infra note 129, at 894.
There has been a long-term trend in our state's jurisprudence sanctioning
the widespread practice of compelling arbitration of negligence claims and
cutting off access to the courts. It is particularly disheartening that the court
would allow this to i"appen in a case involving a minor where the civil justice
system has long recognized its obligation to safeguard their rights by
approving settlements.
Id.
125. Id.
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Nevertheless, the Court's moderated result protects the interests of
injured minors and provides a modicum of protection to businesses
seeking to arbitrate personal injury disputes.126
III. TORTS
Beyond the child context, scholars recognize that Chief Justice
Zazzali "is a man who has always gone to great lengths to serve the
needs of ordinary people."127 Chief Justice Zazzali admits his
predilection for the underdog.128 That consistent outlook has made
him a key component of the Supreme Court's liberal tort law
tradition.129 Nevertheless, the Chiefs jurisprudence reflects a
balanced approach and a healthy respect for stare decisis and
legislative pronouncements.130 Such moderation places Chief Justice
Zazzali within the mainstream of the progressive Supreme Court of
New Jersey.
Particularly insightful is Justice Zazzali's opinion in Maisonave
v. Newark Bears Professional Baseball Club, Inc.,131 concerning a
plaintiff who was struck by a foul ball while purchasing a beverage

126. According to Arthur Leyden III, president of the New Jersey Defense
Association, "As far as commercial recreation facilities go, [Hojnowski] does not change
the status quo regarding the common law on torts. This just allows the center to
choose the forum, and arbitration is usually less expensive." Booth, supra note 119.
127. Kevin Penton, Zazzali is Next Chief Justice, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Neptune,
N.J.), Oct. 24, 2006, at 1A (quoting Rutgers University law professor Frank Askin);
Gallagher, supra note 5 ("[H]e became known as a champion for the underdog: not just
the workers he represented as a labor lawyer in private practice, but the poor, the
elderly, the handicapped, consumers hnd children."); Askin, supra note 22. According
to Justice Helen Hoens, Chief Justice Zazzali "has been a solid voice for those who
otherwise would have no voice." Kate Coscarelli, State Supreme Court Justices Honor
Their Outgoing Chief, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 8, 2007, at 62.
128. Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, then-Associate Justice Zazzali said, "I
have a certain preference for the average citizen. But I don't consider myself the driver
of the rescue squad." Robert G. Seidenstein & Harvey C. Fisher, Changing of the
Guard: Major Recasting of High Court Set in Motion, N.J. LAWYER, Oct. 23, 2006, at 9.
See also Penton, supra note 127 (quoting Chief Justice Zazzali: "I've tried to show
concern for the needs of the average citizen").
129. Ronald Grayzel, Justices Retool Common Law Doctrines; Two Landmark
Decisions Alter Application of Res Ipsa and Respondeat Superior, N.J.L.J., Sept. 2006,
at S-52 (noting "the liberal tradition of the New Jersey Supreme Court in tort law");
see also Wefing, supra note 69, at 1257 (recognizing Court's reputation as a
"progressive, activist, liberal court").
130. The Star-Ledger stated that Chief Justice Zazzali's 'legal reasoning has always
been infused with the desire to reach a just result." Editorial, The Court's Loss and
Jersey's, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 17, 2007, at 2. "He was able to rule for the
little guy when the law and the fact allowed, though it was not always possible to
'drive a rescue ambulance."' Gallagher, supra note 5.
131. 881 A.2d 700 (N.J. 2005).
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on the concourse of a minor league baseball stadium.132 In a question
of first impression, Justice Zazzali analyzed "the limited duty
rule ...[,] a specialized negligence standard shielding stadium
owners and operators" from liability if sufficient protective seating is
provided to spectators.1 33 Although the Court continued to apply the
limited duty rule to the stands of a stadium,134 it declined to extend
the standard to the entire stadium, instead holding that traditional
tort concepts govern areas other than the stands, such as the
concourse where plaintiff was injured.135 The opinion was classic
Zazzali-rejecting immunities for corporations and protecting injured
plaintiffs.136 "To apply the baseball rule to the entire stadium would
convert reasonable protection for owners to immunity by virtually
eliminating their liability for foreseeable, preventable injuries to
their patrons even when the fans are no longer engaged with the
game."137
Despite Justice Zazzali's general preference for the underdog, he
remained unwilling to mold the law for specific ends. Rather,
Maisonave suggests a sensible approach13s that adapted the common
law to changing standards, expanding it incrementally to meet
evolving norms.1 39 As one commentator observed, Maisonave was
"the essence of common sense, a picture of judicial adaptation and/or
activism in the tradition of the common law, a nod to precedent-or,

132. Id. at 702.
133. Id. at 704-05.
134. The Court defined "stands" to include fan seating, stairs used to access seats,
"standing room only" sections, and other areas dedicated to viewing the game. Id. at
707.
135. Id. at 709.
136. "Zazzali has been sensible, but on tough calls he does look out for the rights of
employees, consumers, unions and the poor. He is not shy about taking a more
expansive view of the rights of individuals over corporations or government." Tim
O'Brien, A Labor Lawyer at Heart, He Defends the Underdog, N.J.L.J., Feb 16, 2004, at
S-10.
137. Maisonave, 881 A.2d at 709.
138. In 2000, Justice Zazzali described his judicial philosophy as "sensible." O'Brien,
supra note 136, at S-10.
139. For example, in his dissent in In re Lead Paint, 924 A.2d 484, 506 (N.J. 2007),
released two days before his seventieth birthday, he noted that "[t]his Court has a
duty to reconcile outdated formulations of the common law with the complexities of
contemporary society." Id. The Chief Justice continued:
Common law claims must keep step with the schemes of those who would
unfairly profit at the expense of others. It is our responsibility to ensure that
formalistic distinctions and outdated definitions do not thwart justice.
Rather, we must mold the common law to the unanticipated injustices that
inevitably arise as our society advances through time.
Id. at 511.
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well, all of the above."140 That praise, however, was not
unanimous,141 as the majority opinion had some crying "foul."142 In
response, the New Jersey Legislature, with noticeable haste, enacted
the Spectator Safety Act of 2006-"a complete bar" to suits against
stadium owners by spectators injured by the inherent risks of
watching professional baseball.143 The Legislature felt that the
Supreme Court had struck out.144
Another notable opinion written during the latter part of Justice
Zazzali's tenure was Creanga v. Jardal,145 where the Court held that
expert opinions derived from "differential diagnosis"46 are
admissible.147 The facts were compelling: Mihaela Creanga, twentyfour-weeks pregnant with twins, was struck from behind by a Lucent
Technologies-owned van.148 Two days later, Creanga went into
premature labor. Although her second infant survived, her first
infant died immediately after delivery as a result of the premature
labor.149 The delivering doctor, Dr. Faramarz Zarghami, concluded,
after performing a differential diagnosis, that the "trauma of the
accident" caused the premature labor.15o However, Dr. Zarghami also
signed a preoperative diagnosis report stating that the cause "was an
incompetent cervix, not the automobile trauma."151

140. Robert G. Seidenstein, Case Offers Playbook on Justices, N.J. LAWYER, Sept.
19, 2005, at 1.
141. Justice Rivera-Soto, joined by Justice LaVecchia, rejected the majority's hybrid
rule. Maisonave,881 A.2d at 713-18 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting).
142. According to critics, Maisonave "ignores Justice Holmes's admonition that the
life of the law has been experience, not logic. In this case, the owners and operators of
such stadiums in New Jersey can, with good cause, cry 'foul."' Baseball, Vending Carts
and the New Jersey Supreme Court, N.J. LAWYER, Oct. 31, 2005, at 6.
143. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-43 to -48 (West 2000). The legislative response was
"one of the fastest moves to overturn a court opinion." Kathleen Bird, Lawyers Boo
Ballpark Immunity, N.J. LAWYER, Jan. 16, 2006, at 4. The act protected New Jersey's
burgeoning minor league baseball industry. Charles Toutant, Play Ball! Carefully,
N.J.L.J., Sept. 19, 2005, at 1.
144. The Assembly unanimously approved the measure. The Senate approved the
bill 25-7. Bird, supra note 143.
145. 886 A.2d 633 (N.J. 2005).
146. "[A] differential diagnosis is a medical construct for determining which one of
two or more diseases or conditions a patient is suffering from, by systematically
comparing and contrasting their symptoms." Id. at 639 (quotation omitted).
147. Id. at 640.
148. Id. at 635-36.
149. Id. at 636.
150. Id. Dr. Zarghami testified that, "[w]ith a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, yes, I think [the trauma of the accident was] probably the cause of her
premature labor." Id. (latter alteration in original).
151. Id. at 637.
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Nevertheless, Justice Zazzali declared that Dr. Zarghami's
inconsistencies went to credibility, not admissibility.152 Therefore,
because Dr. Zarghami's opinion satisfied the other requirements for
admitting expert testimony,153 the Court joined the majority of courts
that freely admit differential diagnosis.154 Although espousing a
narrow evidentiary principle, Creanga represents a significant
victory for plaintiffs,55 who may now prove causation with greater
ease by introducing expert differential diagnosis, to defeat motions
for summary judgment.156
Although injured plaintiffs generally fare well in tort opinions
authored by Justice Zazzali,157 occasionally their recovery has been
foreclosed, as evidenced by Alston v. City of Camden,158 a case
implicating the charitable immunity doctrine,159 specifically the Tort

152. Id. at 643.
153. Id. at 638-39.
154. Id. at 639-40.
155. Henry Gottlieb, A Differential Diagnosis Is Not a Net Opinion, High Court
Says, N.J.L.J., Dec. 19, 2005, at 1, 8 (describing Creanga as "good mostly for
plaintiffs").
156. Indeed, in Creanga,the Court remanded the matter for "reinstatement of the
complaint," permitting the lawsuit to proceed. Creanga,886 A.2d at 643.
One commentator said that Creanga "opens the door for plaintiffs and defendants to
have another way to get your expert over the admissibility hurdle." Gottlieb, supra
note 155. According to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Creanga allows
doctors to explain their opinions on causation, without framing their answers in
legalese. Id.
157. In addition to the opinions addressed above, Justice Zazzali has authored
numerous other plaintiff-friendly opinions during his term on the Supreme Court of
New Jersey. Foremost among those not discussed above is Caballero v. Martinez, 897
A.2d 1026 (N.J. 2006), where a unanimous Court held that an undocumented alien
was eligible to receive benefits from the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:6-61 to -91. (West 2002), after being severely injured while riding as a
passenger in an uninsured vehicle. In a case that underscored the Court's commitment
to human rights, James R. Zazzali, InternationalHuman Rights: An Overview: Annual
Vanderbilt Address to the New Jersey Alumni of HarvardLaw School, 37 SETON HALL
L. REV. 661, 685 (2007), the Court adopted an expansive view of "resident"-the term
central to claimant's eligibility under the fund. Indeed, plaintiff was a resident who
"lived here, worked here, paid taxes here, and stayed out of trouble here." Id. In
championing the blameless plaintiff, Justice Zazzali wrote that the Court's holding
furthered the statute's purpose of "providing compensation to those injured through no
fault of their own." Caballero, 897 A.2d at 1033.
158. 773 A.2d 693 (N.J. 2001).
159. Another charitable immunity opinion written by Justice Zazzali is O'Connell v.
State, 795 A.2d 857 (N.J. 2002). There, a full-time student at a nonprofit state
university suffered bone fractures after stumbling down campus stairs. Id. at 858. The
Court held that the university was entitled to immunity under the Charitable
Immunity Act's plain language. Id. at 861. Justice Stein harshly criticized the
majority, calling the opinion "discordant and incongruous." Id. at 867 (Stein, J.,
dissenting).
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Claims Act's immunity provisions.160 There, a police officer pursued a
suspected drug dealer on foot.161 During the chase, the officer's gun
dislodged from his holster and fell to the ground.162 As a result of the
officer's failure to engage the firearm's safety feature, the gun
discharged, with the errant bullet striking plaintiff.163
In reinstating the jury verdict in defendant's favor,164 Justice
Zazzali focused on the "pursuit immunity" and "good faith immunity"
provisions of the Tort Claims Act, which "provides immunity for
public entities with liability as the exception."65 Particularly telling
was Justice Zazzali's emphatic language in discussing pursuit
immunity, a doctrine that prohibits liability for "any injury caused
by" an escapee, except where "a police officer engages in willful
misconduct."166 After finding that the doctrine provided immunity
regardless of whether the injuries were caused by the pursued or the
pursuer, or whether the injury was caused by a police car or some
other instrument,167 the former attorney general with "an aptitude
for law enforcement"168 penned the following:
[I]t fairly can be argued that it... is fundamentally unfair to
impose liability on police officers who risk their own lives in
those pursuits, who by definition face emergency circumstances
and extraordinary events in pursuit, who act in good faith, and
who should be encouraged to pursue suspects and to do so
effectively. The unfairness to both the innocent bystander and
the police officers is palpable, but society cannot have it both
ways ....[We cannot] expect, indeed demand, effective law
enforcement and then dilute that expectation with the
imposition of liability because of the bystander who may be a
victim of unfairness.169

However, Justice Zazzali's two charitable immunity opinions coincided with a "trend
by the Court to afford charities, churches and educational institutions the broadest
possible protections against litigation, including a fast track to summary judgment."
Ronald Grayzel, The Floodgates Open, N.J.L.J., Sept. 1, 2003, at S-22.
160. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 59:12-3 (West 2006).
161. Alston, 773 A.2d at 695.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 696.
165. Id. at 697.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 698-99.
168. Michael Booth, Zazzali, a Liberal With a Cop Side, Named to Court, N.J.L.J.,
May 8, 2000, at 1, (noting that in private practice Chief Justice represented public
unions including police officers' unions); cf. O'Brien, supra note 136, at S-10 (noting
that in criminal cases, Justice Zazzali "give[s] police the benefit of the doubt").
169. Alston, 773 A.2d at 700-01.
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The Court's 4-3 split demonstrates the closeness of the appeal.170
The sympathetic postures of both parties-provision of recovery to a
blameless victim and immunization of a law enforcement officer171
undeserving of punishment-are visible in Justice Zazzali's opinion,
which invites the Legislature "to reconsider the issue and alter the
equation."172
IV. WORKERS' RIGHTS

In his seven years on the bench, Chief Justice Zazzali was an
unswerving champion of workers' rights. Our examination of his
workers' rights jurisprudence begins with two cases in which Justice
Zazzali's predilections for injured plaintiffs and aggrieved workers
overlapped, as the Court delineated the scope of the Workers'
Compensation Act. The first was Lozano v. Frank DeLuca
Construction.173That appeal arose from the plaintiffs employment as
a laborer for a construction company.174 At the end of a shift, his
supervisor directed him to "get in" a go-cart at the site.1 75 Despite his
inability to drive, the employee obeyed.176 Inevitably, the plaintiff
crashed the go-cart and suffered severe injuries.77
The Workers' Compensation Act provides that employers shall
compensate employees for accidental injuries, except when such
injuries arise from "recreational or social activities."17s However,
carved out from that exception are injuries sustained from "such
recreational or social activities [that] are a regular incident of
employment and produce a benefit to the employer beyond

170. Justice Long, joined by Chief Justice Poritz and Justice Coleman, dissented. Id.
at 704 (Long, J., dissenting). Finding the immunity provision inapplicable, the dissent
viewed the tortious conduct as the officer's failure to ensure that his gun's safety
mechanism was on, not the dislodging of the gun from its holster. Id. at 705.
171. In Shaw v. City of Jersey City, 811 A.2d 404, 411 (N.J. 2002), Justice Zazzali
found in an injured police officer's favor. There, the plaintiff and another undercover
officer observed what they believed to be a stolen vehicle. Id. at 406. When the plaintiff
approached the suspected perpetrators, a vehicle accelerated towards the plaintiff and
hit him, breaking his ankle in three places. Id. "The driver fled and was not
apprehended." Id. In remanding the matter for entry of judgment for plaintiff, the
Court defined "accident" broadly under the state's uninsured motorist statute, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (West 1994), to allow injured plaintiffs to recover when the
injuries occur because of another's intentional conduct. Id. 410-11.
172. Alston, 773 A.2d at 701.
173. 842 A.2d 156 (N.J. 2004).
174. Id. at 159.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 2000).
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improvement in employee health and morale .... "179 After
examining the Act's century-long evolution, a unanimous Court held
that "when an employer compels an employee to participate in an
activity that ordinarily would be considered recreational or social in
nature, the employer thereby renders that activity a work-related
task as a matter of law."18o Thus, the Court recognized that
employers may "expand the scope of employment" by directing
employees to engage in conduct beyond their general duties.181
According to Justice Zazzali, "A contrary reading of [the Act]
would impose on employees a classic Hobson's choice: obey the
employer's order and jeopardize eligibility for workers' compensation
benefits, or refuse to engage in the required activity and risk loss of
employment."182 Such was unacceptable to the former labor lawyer,
who, consistent with precedent, liberally construed the "humane
social legislation."183 By permitting injured employees to recover for
injuries arising in quasi-work situations, Lozano highlights Justice
Zazzali's "real world" approach, whereby jurisprudence rooted in
legislative intent and past precedent meets compassion.
The second workers' compensation case is Sager v. O.A. Peterson
Construction C0.184 The plaintiff, employed by a New Jersey
company, was working at a construction site in New York on
September 11, 2001.185 Because the terrorist attacks of that day
closed all bridges and tunnels between New York and New Jersey,
the plaintiff and his co-workers were unable to return home at the
end of their shift.186 At a supervisor's behest, they went to a local
eatery.187 On the way back to work, the plaintiff "was seriously

179. Id.
180. Lozano, 842 A.2d at 167. Significantly, both attorneys hailed the ruling as "a
logical application of the law." Michael Booth, Non-Work-Related Recreational Injury
Compensable, Supreme Court Rules, N.J.L.J., Mar. 15, 2004, at 5.
181. Lozano, 842 A.2d at 167.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 167, 168 (quotation omitted). Justice Zazzali quoted the same language
in Sager v. O.A. Peterson Constr. Co., 862 A.2d 1119, 1127 (N.J. 2004).
Although the Court remanded the matter, it stated that an employer's direct
commands and indirect pressure may compel employees to engage in certain acts.
Lozano, 842 A.2d at 168, 170. However, if indirect compulsion is alleged, an injured
"employee must demonstrate an objectively reasonable basis in fact for believing that
the employer had compelled participation in the activity." Id. at 168. Resolution of
such issues requires a case-by-case analysis of many factors. Id.
184. 862A.2d 1119.
185. Id. at 1120.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1120-22.

20071

TRIBUTE TO CHIEFJUSTICE ZAZZALI

injured in an automobile accident," suffering femur and knee injuries
requiring twelve days of hospitalization. 188
The Court addressed when an injury arises "out of and in the
course of employment" under the Workers' Compensation Act.189 The
majority opinion,190 written by Justice Zazzali, found that
"compulsion, standing alone, brings an activity that is otherwise
unrelated to work within the scope of employment."91 The Court
concluded that "when an employer compels an employee's
participation in an activity generally viewed as recreational or social
in nature, the employer thereby renders that activity work-related as
a matter of law."192 Because the plaintiffs supervisor testified that he
ordered his employees to eat an early dinner and return to the job
site, the record contained sufficient evidonce to uphold the agency
judgment in the plaintiffs favor.193
Justice Zazzali's steadfast protection of workers is also
highlighted by two opinions involving the New Jersey Conscientious
Employee Protection Act (CEPA),194 better known as the New Jersey
Whistleblower Protection Act. As is apparent in much of his
jurisprudence, the Chief Justice's decisions on CEPA are protective of
workers, but also mindful of real world consequences and the
necessity for practical decision making.195
The first CEPA case, and perhaps the finest example of this
judicial philosophy, is Justice Zazzali's opinion in Dzwonar v.

188. Id. at 1120-21.
189. Id. at 1122 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 2000)).
190. Justice Wallace penned a dissent, joined by Justice Rivera-Soto, arguing that
the case should be remanded due to conflicting testimony in light of the "going and
coming" rule, which precludes compensation benefits for injuries sustained during
routine commuting. Id. at 1127 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
191. Sager, 862 A.2d at 1123 (quoting Lozano, 842 A.2d 156, 167 (N.J. 2004)).
192. Id. (quoting Lozano, 842 A.2d at 159). Justice Zazzali's opinion in Sager was
viewed as "yet another expansion of the 'going and coming rule' that has broadened
availability of workers' benefits over the years." Michael Booth, Workers' Comp Covers
Worker Hurt Going to Dinner at Boss's Instance, N.J.L.J., Dec. 27, 2004, at 7.
193. Sager, 862 A.2d at 1124.
194. N.J STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1 (West 2001).
195. See Coscarelli, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting Nancy Erika Smith, a frequent
litigator before the Court, stating that Chief Justice Zazzali "never lost sight of what it
is like to work for a living and be a regular person").
When Zazzali was elevated to the post, the New Jersey Lawyer observed that the
new Chief Justice was "a Democrat of the old school, deeply concerned about the rights
of working people while generally moderate on other issues. On the court, his
otherwise dispassionate approach changes noticeably when issues involving the
workplace arise." Robert G. Seidenstein, Call Him Chief-Zazzali: Rounded Intellect,
Intensity with Humor, N.J. LAWER, Sept. 25, 2006, at 1. See also O'Brien, supra note
136, at S-10 ("In workplace disputes, more often than not [Justice Zazzali] has sided
with employees.").
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McDevitt.196 In Dzwonar, the plaintiff, an arbitration officer and
elected executive board member of Local 54 of the Hotel and
Restaurant Employees International Union, alleged that the union
improperly discharged her in violation of CEPA.197 In 1996, the
plaintiff was elected as recording secretary to the union's executive
board, and later accepted a paid position as an arbitration officer and
representative for the union.198 However, shortly after the election,
the plaintiff came into conflict with other members of the executive
board over various internal policies and complained that the
executive board failed to disclose certain decisions to the union's
membership in violation of its bylaws.199 Plaintiff also alleged that,
although not illegal, the executive board's refusal to read its minutes
at meetings denied rank-and-file members their right to participate,
deliberate, and vote in union matters as prescribed by the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).200
Plaintiff brought her concerns to the executive board's attention
and demanded that the membership be informed of its actions.201
Thereafter, the executive board discharged the plaintiff from her
position as a union arbitrator, claiming that she was insubordinate
and had mishandled internal documents.202 The plaintiff maintained
her position as recording secretary of the executive board, but
continued to raise concerns about open access to executive board
decisions.203 She then brought suit under CEPA against other
members of the executive board, claiming that she was "terminated
in retaliation for expressing [her] opinions and [her] efforts to keep
[the] Union members informed of important Union business."24 She
further claimed that her termination was in retaliation for her
"reasonable belief' that the executive board's failure to inform its
membership of its actions violated the LMRDA and the union's
bylaws.205
A jury found that the defendants violated CEPA.206 The
Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the plaintiffs CEPA
claim was preempted by federal labor law and that, even assuming
the plaintiff was discharged because she reasonably believed the
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

828 A.2d 893 (N.J. 2003).
Id. at 896.
Id. at 897.
Id.
Id. at 898. The LMRDA can be found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006).
Dzwonar, 828 A.2d at 898.

202.
203.

Id.
Id.

204.
205.

Id. at 898-99.
Id. at 899.

206.

Id.
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LRMDA required more of the defendants, LRMDA in itself could not
provide a basis for a CEPA claim.207
A unanimous Court affirmed the Appellate Division decision to
dismiss the plaintiffs lawsuit, but in doing so significantly eased the
burden on plaintiffs bringing CEPA claims. Justice Zazzali stated
that the issue was whether the plaintiff "reasonably believed" that
she was terminated in violation of law and public policy.208 Although
the Court previously held that a plaintiff need only show a
"reasonable belief' that a law or mandate of public policy had been
violated-not an actual violation-a majority of lower courts added a
threshold requirement that the trial court must "first find and
enunciate the specific terms of a statute or regulation, or the clear
expression of public policy, which would be violated if the facts as
alleged are true."209
However, writing for the Court, Justice Zazzali rejected that
additional requirement.210 Because CEPA is remedial legislation that
should be liberally construed, Justice Zazzali reasoned that a
contrary holding effectively would require whistleblowing employees
to become lawyers.211 Instead, the trial court should "make a
threshold determination that there is a substantial nexus between
the complained-of conduct and a law or public policy identified by the
court or the plaintiff."212 Only then may the jury determine whether
the plaintiff actually held such a belief and, if so, whether that belief
was objectively reasonable.213
In so holding, Justice Zazzali provided CEPA plaintiffs with a
significant advantage and reaffirmed CEPA's "reasonable belief'
language. However, in applying that test to the plaintiffs allegations,
the Court made clear that its construct was not merely a rubber
stamp for getting CEPA claims to a jury. Indeed, the Court found
that the plaintiff did not have an objectively reasonable belief that
207. Id. at 899-900.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 900 (quoting Fineman v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 640 A.2d 1161,
1169 (emphasis added)).
210. Id.
We agree with the lower courts that when a plaintiff brings an action
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c, the trial court must identify a statute,
regulation, rule, or public policy that closely relates to the complained-of
conduct. The trial court can and should enter judgment for a defendant when
no such law or policy is forthcoming. We do not agree, however, that a
plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, actually would violate that statute,
rule or public policy.
Id.
211. Id.at901.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 901-02.
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the executive board's actions violated either the LMRDA or the
Union's bylaws.214 Accordingly, the Court rejected the plaintiffs
claims.215
The following year, Justice Zazzali reaffirmed his belief in a
broad and protective application of CEPA,216 to protect discharged
employees, in his dissent in Maw v. Advanced Clinical
Communications, Inc.217 There, the Court held that an employer did
not engage in impermissible retaliatory action under CEPA when it
discharged the plaintiff after she refused to sign an employment
agreement with a noncompete agreement. 218 The plaintiff alleged
that the noncompete agreement was against a clear mandate of
public policy and, therefore, her discharge violated CEPA, which
prohibits the discharge of employees who object to or refuse to
participate in any activity incompatible with a clear mandate of
public policy.219 The majority disagreed, concluding that there was no
"clear mandate" of public policy at issue because the private dispute
did not have "public ramifications."220
However, in a "strong dissent,"221 Justice Zazzali maintained
that "the allegations of the complaint implicate a clear mandate of
public policy that the majority ... fails to apprehend. . . ."222 Justice
Zazzali argued that "in New Jersey historically we have presumed
[noncompete agreements] to be invalid as restraints on trade and,
therefore, violative of public policy unless an employer demonstrates
the reasonableness of its agreement."223 Further, the Justice
contended that the majority's characterization of the issue as a
214. Id. at 902-04.
215. Id. at 904. Justice Zazzali's opinion in Dzwonar "made clear that plaintiffs
suing under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act must be very specific how
their allegations of being ill-treated as whistleblowers run afoul of state law or public
policy, and they also must have the goods to back up those claims." Robert G.
Seidenstein, Political Controversy Abounds; Election Law, New Justice Selection at
Center Stage, N.J. LAWYER, Aug. 25, 2003.
216. Scholars recognize that New Jersey's jurisprudence, including Dzwonar, has
made CEPA "the most far-reaching whistleblower statute in the nation." Richard A.
West, Jr., No Plaintiff Left Behind: Liability for Workplace Discrimination and
Retaliation in New Jersey, 28 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 127, 141 (2003) (quoting Mehlman
v. Mobile Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000, 1008 (N.J. 1998)).
217. 846 A.2d 604 (N.J. 2004).
218. Id. at 607.
219. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3c(3) (West 2000)).
220. Id. at 608.
221. Michael J. Garrison, Limiting the Protection for Employees from Compelled
Noncompete Agreements Under State Whistleblower Laws: A Critical Analysis of Maw
v. Advanced Clinical Communications, 20 LAB. LAW. 257, 285 (2005), availableat
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/laborlawyer/20.3.pdf (last visited July 15, 2007).
222. Maw, 846 A.2d at 610 (Zazzali, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 613.
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private dispute was improper because "it does not reckon with, much
less reconcile, the vital public-policy considerations that undergird
the jurisprudence of non-compete agreements."224 According to
Justice Zazzali, "For centuries the courts of England and of this State
have stated repeatedly that covenants-not-to-compete implicate
important public-policy interests."225 In striking words, Justice
Zazzali wrote: "If there is any continuing truth to that notion, then a
plaintiff who claims that she resisted signing an agreement that she
believed to violate that public policy cannot be summarily cast out of
court on the ground that her concerns constitute only a private
dispute with her employer."226 Rather, Justice Zazzali argued that
the better approach "would be to hold that a plaintiff has stated a
claim under CEPA when she has alleged that she refused to sign a
non-compete agreement that she believed to be in violation of public
policy."227 An employer would then have the opportunity to
demonstrate the reasonableness of the agreement as a defense to the
22
action. 8

Chief Justice Zazzali defended workers' rights through his last
days on the Court,229 as evidenced by one of his final opinionsIliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.230 In that case, the Court was asked

224.

225.
226.

Id. at 615.
Id.
Id.

227. Id. at 616.
228. Id. at 610. Another of Justice Zazzali's noteworthy dissents came in Camden
Board of Education v. Alexander, 854 A.2d 342 (N.J. 2004). There, a four-member
majority of the Court permitted a school board to terminate fifteen custodians for
nonarbitrary and noncapricious reasons without being subject to an arbitrator's
review. Id. at 356. Justice Zazzali, joined by Justices Long and Albin, dissented,
arguing that arbitration should be permitted in this "negotiable and substantively
arbitrable" matter. Id. at 378 (Zazzali, J., dissenting). Contending that the majority
departed from the Court's well-settled principles, Zazzali vociferously opined that the
majority's approach "amount[ed] to a departure that steps backwards in the otherwise
commendable progress this Court has made in establishing fairness in our labor-law
jurisprudence." Id. at 356. The Legislature later overruled the majority opinion and
vindicated Justice Zazzali's perspective by amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3. See
Bd. of Educ. of Alpha v. Alpha Educ. Ass'n, 918 A.2d 579, 587-88 (N.J. 2006). That
amendment now provides that courts and agencies interpreting collective bargaining
agreements "shall be bound by a presumption in favor of arbitration." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:13A-5.3 (West Supp. 2007).
229. Another opinion from the Chief Justice's final year on the bench is New Jersey
Turnpike Authority v. Local 196, IFPTE, 920 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2007), where the Court, in
deference to an arbitrator's determination, upheld an award reinstating a toll collector
who, in an act of road rage, fired a paintball gun at a slower-moving vehicle that
impeded his commute home. Despite that decision's deference to an arguably
debatable arbitral award, the opinion was publicly criticized. Editorial, Ruling Misses
The Mark, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Neptune, N.J.), Apr. 25, 2007, at 18.
230. 922 A.2d 710 (N.J. 2007).

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:4

to consider whether a putative class of 72,000 former and current
hourly Wal-Mart employees should be certified.231 The employees
alleged that Wal-Mart denied them rest and meal breaks and forced
them to work off-the-clock in violation of corporate policy, statutory
law, and administrative regulations.232 The trial court denied class
certification, finding, among other reasons, that common questions
did not predominate over individual issues and that the proposed
class members had an alternative, superior method for redress in the
Wage Collection Division of the Department of Labor.233 The
Appellate Division affirmed.234
Writing for the majority,235 Chief Justice Zazzali reversed the
Appellate Division and held that the class had satisfied the
requirements for class certification.236 In making that determination,
Chief Justice Zazzali emphasized the disparity in resources between
the parties, stating: "Plaintiffs are hourly employees of a retail store.
Independently, they lack the financial resources of their corporate
adversary. The equalizing mechanism of representative litigation
allows them to adequately seek redress."237 Further, the Court could
not "ignore the reality that if the proposed class is not certified,
thousands of aggrieved employees will not seek redress for
defendant's alleged wrongdoing."238 Indeed, Chief Justice Zazzali
wrote:
By equalizing adversaries, we provide access to the courts for
small claimants. By denying shelter to an alleged wrongdoing
defendant, we deter similar transgressions against an
otherwise vulnerable class-72,000 hourly-paid retail workers
purportedly harmed by their corporate employer's uniform
misconduct.239

231. Id. at 714. The statewide class included all current and former Wal-Mart
hourly employees from May 30, 1996 to the present. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 716-17.
234. Id. at 717.
235. Id. at 728-29. In dissent, Justice Rivera-Soto argued that the determinations
below should be affirmed due to the substantial deference owed to the trial court's
discretionary ruling. Id. at 730-31 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 728-29 (majority opinion).
237. Id. at 726. According to former Associate Justice Verniero, Iliadis "opened the
door widely to class action litigation in New Jersey." Jeffrey Gold, Workers' Suit vs.
Wal-Mart Gets New Life, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 1, 2007, at 25. The StarLedger praised Chief Justice Zazzali's Iliadis opinion, noting that "[s]uch suits allow
employees-who are often afraid of retaliation, lack resources or are too intimidated to
take on a corporate behemoth-to redress their grievances in court." Editorial,
Recognizing Worker Rights, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 4, 2007, at 14.
238. Iliadis, 922 A.2d at 726.
239. Id. at 728.
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In permitting the litigation to proceed as a class action,240 Chief
Justice Zazzali and the Supreme Court honored "[t]he class action's
historic mission of taking care of the smaller guy."241
V.

CORPORATE

A.

LAW242

Accountant Liability

A starting point for an analysis of Chief Justice Zazzali's
decisions in the corporate context is then-Justice Zazzali's opinion in
NCP Litigation Trust v. KPMG LLP.243 Born out of the corporate
financial reporting scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the
dispute in NCP concerned two corporate officers of Physician
Computer Network, Inc. who intentionally misrepresented the
corporation's financial status to the company's investors and its
accounting firm, KPMG.244 This resulted in improper inflation of the
company's financial status and, after the fraud was uncovered,
ultimately led to the company declaring bankruptcy and significant
investor losses.245 Various shareholder groups filed investor lawsuits
against the corporation and the offending corporate officers, resulting
in cash settlements.246

240. Buttressing the Court's "confidence in the resourcefulness, creativity, and
administrative abilities of trial courts," were recent developments in Pennsylvania and
California. Id. at 727. Specifically, similarly filed statewide class actions against WalMart proceeded to trial and jury verdicts in both states. Id. In Philadelphia, the jury
awarded a class of 186,000 current and former employees $78.5 million. Kris W.
Scibiorski, Class Certification; Victory for Wal-Mart Workers, N.J. LAWYER, June 4,
2007, at 3. According to the Court, New Jersey's "trial courts are equally capable of
managing such complex litigation." Iliaids, 922 A.2d at 727.
241. Iliaids, 922 A.2d at 719 (quotation marks and quotation omitted). "In short, the
class action's equalization function opens the courthouse doors for those who cannot
enter alone." Id.
242. It bears noting that the following cases are not-nor are they intended to bean all-inclusive recitation of Chief Justice Zazzali's opinions in the general area of
corporate law. Further, one will undoubtedly realize that the term "corporate law" has
been employed loosely. In that respect, this section includes an analysis of not only
what might be thought of as classic corporate law cases such as those involving
accountant liability, but also an analysis of some of Chief Justice Zazzali's decisions on
other "corporate law" matters such as general property law. The hope in employing
this loose definition is to not let the difficulty of finding a proper descriptive term for
these cases stand in the way of this Tribute's true purpose-to analyze and reflect on
Chief Justice Zazzali's judicial philosophy and his contributions to New Jersey civil
jurisprudence during his tenure.
243. 901 A.2d 871 (N.J. 2006).
244. Id. at 873-75.
245. Id. at 874-76.
246. Id. at 876.
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However, a trust created out of the bankruptcy proceedings, the
NCP Litigation Trust, also filed suit against KPMG.247 The trust
alleged that KPMG "negligently failed to exercise due professional
care in performing its audits and in the preparation of its financial
statements and audit reports."248 Among other allegations, the trust
alleged that: the financial records certified by KPMG during the
fraud were in complete disarray; that they could not be reconstituted
by another auditor; that KPMG never verified the receipt and deposit
of a $3.5 million check that was part of a fraudulent asset purchase;
and that KPMG failed to follow generally accepted accounting
principles in its audits.249
In response, KPMG argued that the suit against it was barred by
the imputation doctrine.250 Essentially, KPMG contended that the
corporate officers' fraudulent conduct was imputed to the corporation
such that the corporate shareholders had constructive knowledge of
that fraudulent conduct and, therefore, could not sue KPMG for its
allegedly negligent conduct in auditing the company's financial
1
statements. 25
Writing for the Court,252 Justice Zazzali granted "a major victory
for shareholders"23 and rejected KPMG's contention that the
imputation doctrine barred suit. Focusing on the harm that would be
wrought on shareholders and the inequity that would be created by
allowing allegedly negligent parties to escape liability, Justice
Zazzali argued:
[T]he imputation defense exists to protect innocent third parties
from being sued by corporations whose agents have engaged in
malfeasant behavior against those third parties.... However,
this matter does not present the typical circumstances for
which the imputation defense was designed because PCN's
agents did not directly defraud an innocent third party. They
defrauded the corporation and its creditors. In that respect,
KPMG is not a victim of the fraud in need of protection.254
In remanding the matter, Justice Zazzali emphasized:

247. Id.
248. Id. at 876-77.
249. Id. at 877.
250. Id. at 877-78.
251. See id. at 879-80.
252. Justices LaVecchia and Rivera-Soto both dissented, each filing written
opinions. See id. at 890 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting); id. at 892 (Rivera-Soto, J.,
dissenting).
253. Robert G. Seidenstein, Shareholders Can PursueAuditor, N.J. LAWYER, July 3,
2006, at 5.
254. 901 A.2d at 882.
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If we allow imputation to shield a negligent auditor from the
consequences of its actions, we will force shareholders to
shoulder the entire loss-a result that violates principles of
fairness and equity ....

In circumstances such as these, where

an auditor allegedly failed to comply with applicable standards,
we fail to see how the auditor can be deemed to be an innocent
party deserving of protection. To deter future such wrongdoing,
we will not indiscriminately provide a safe haven for allegedly
negligent conduct. 255

B.

ArbitrationAgreements and Subprime Lending

Although this Tribute has predominantly focused on the Chiefs
majority opinions, another of the Chiefs dissenting opinions is
worthy of examination: 256 Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris,257 which
involved subprime predatory lending. The plaintiff, Alberta Harris, a
seventy-eight-year-old woman, entered into a $37,700 mortgage loan
contract with Delta Funding Corporation, a subprime lender
specializing in high interest loans to individuals with poor credit or
limited financial means.258 The plaintiffs loan was guaranteed by a
mortgage on her Newark home, which Harris previously owned
outright.29 Harris had little education or financial sophistication,
and was living off of a modest, fixed income.260 The circumstances of
Harris's entering into the contract also were suspect, as the loan
company sent a representative to Harris's home while she was sick in
bed and allegedly told her that she was required to sign the papers at

255. Id. at 887. Writing on the effect of NCP and the Appellate Division's decision in
Division of Investment v. Qwest Communications International,Inc., 904 A.2d 775
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), one commentator noted that "accountants must be
aware that their liability in New Jersey has dramatically changed in the past few
months." David M. Stauss, Aiding and Abetting Corporate Fraud, N.J.L.J., Nov. 13,
2006, at S-9; see also Robert Schwaneberg, State's High Court Revives Lawsuit vs.
KPMG, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 6, 2006, at 67.
256. An analysis of dissenting opinions may seem to be a strange choice, given our
focus on Chief Justice Zazzali's influence on the civil law during his tenure on the
Court. However, the purpose of this Tribute is not merely to provide a recitation of
decisions. Rather, the purpose is also to gain an insight into the man who wrote those
decisions. In that respect, perhaps the greatest insights into an individual jurist's
judicial philosophy are not gained by analysis of majority opinions, which necessarily
require group consensus and input. To the contrary, it is in dissenting opinions where
one can truly gain insight about the author. However, it is worth noting that Chief
Justice Zazzali was "[n]ot a frequent dissenter." Gallagher, supra note 5.
257. 912 A.2d 104 (N.J. 2006).
258. Id. at 108. The instant loan was at an interest rate of fourteen percent. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 108. Harris's monthly income consisted of $988 in social security checks.
Id. at 118 (Zazzali, J., dissenting).
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that time. 261 Harris inevitably defaulted on the loan, and Wells Fargo
initiated a foreclosure suit in New Jersey state court. 262 Harris
responded by alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act.263 In response, Delta filed a petition in federal
district court to compel arbitration based on a loan agreement
provision that permitted either party to compel arbitration in lieu of
litigation.264
The subject arbitration agreement also: (1) permitted the
arbitrator to decide, at the end of arbitration, which party should
bear the costs of the proceeding; (2) required that each party bear its
own expenses for attorney and witness fees regardless of which party
prevailed; (3) stated that the costs of any appeal would be borne by
the appealing party regardless of the appeal's outcome; (4) precluded
the borrower from engaging in any class action suit against Delta;
and (5) contained a provision excluding the underlying foreclosure
action from being submitted to arbitration in the same proceeding.265
The district court rejected Harris's motion for summary judgment,
concluding that although the agreement was a contract of adhesion,
it was not substantively unconscionable.266 On appeal, the Third
Circuit certified the question of whether the contract was
unconscionable to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.267 Based on a
limited review of the certified question, the Court held that the costshifting, attorney fee, and appellate fee provisions could be
unconscionable depending on the arbitrator's interpretation of such
provisions, that the class-action waiver was not unconscionable, that
the provision excluding foreclosure actions from arbitration was not
unconscionable, and that the arbitration agreement was not
cumulatively unconscionable.268
However, in a vigorous dissent, Justice Zazzali argued that the
majority had not gone far enough and should have found that all of
the subject provisions were unconscionable and that the agreement
in whole was unconscionable.269 According to Justice Zazzali, the:
[C]ircumstances under which this matter comes before the
Court-on a sparse record that consists of mere allegationspreclude the court from properly examining whether factors
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 118-19.
Id. at 109 (majority opinion).
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 117 (Zazzali, J., dissenting).
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such as age, literacy, lack of sophistication, unfair bargaining
tactics, or the particular setting of the contract formation affect
the determination of procedural unconscionability. Suffice it to
note that the allegations, if proven true, including the late night
visit to Harris's home and the rushed nature of her signing the
documents, could have a significant effect on future
unconscionability determinations, such as whether the loan
agreement itself is unconscionable.270
Nonetheless, Justice Zazzali determined that the subject
provisions, on their face, created a situation "so one-sided as to shock
the ... conscience."271 He also noted that the provisions required a
litigant-in this case a poor litigant-to defend claims in two forums:
a foreclosure action and an arbitration.272 "[A]lthough the majority is
correct in noting that foreclosure actions are properly commenced in
court, that fact does not give Delta the right to exclude claims that it
finds unfavorable from that court action by forcing them into
arbitration."273
As it pertained to the contract provisions precluding class-action
lawsuits, Justice Zazzali noted that:
[T]he question is whether the class action waiver is
unconscionable in the context in which Delta concededly
conducts its business, that is, Delta's business model seeks out
those who are in financial difficulty. It is precisely those types
of individuals who would benefit from being able to enter into
class action suits and minimize the expense of litigation.274
Finally, Justice Zazzali opined that the agreement was
cumulatively unconscionable, stating "the purpose of the agreement
is not merely to arbitrate claims; it is to arbitrate claims in a way
that significantly advantages Delta at the expense of borrowers."275
In words that summarize his judicial philosophy, Justice Zazzali
concluded: "Because I believe that this agreement exploits the
individual and manipulates the process, I respectfully concur in part
and dissent in part."276
C.

Property

This Tribute's broad definition of "corporate law" also permits
analysis of Chief Justice Zazzali's property decisions, specifically in
the areas of eminent domain and landlord-tenant law. As it pertains
270. Id. at 120 (citations omitted).
271. Id. at 122 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 123.
274. Id. at 123-24.
275. Id. at 124.
276. Id. at 125.
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to eminent domain, two of the Chiefs decisions have been heralded
as significant victories for property owners. 277 The first decision was
in Mansoldo v. State.278 In Mansoldo, a company owned by Ronaldo
Mansoldo purchased a piece of property adjacent to the Hackensack
River in 1959.279 Many years later, in 1993, Mansoldo's son sought to
construct two single-family homes on the property, which was a
permitted use under the local zoning code.2s0 However, because the
property was in an area that the state had deemed-in 1982, twentythree years after the purchase of the property-to be subject to
fluvial flooding, Mansoldo was required to obtain a special permit
from the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).281
However, the DEP rejected Mansoldo's application citing flooding
concerns. 28 2 The DEP also found that Mansoldo had not 'adequately
pursued alternative uses for the property' such as selling it 'to
adjacent property owners for use as a parking lot, a park, or open
space."'283 The matter was thereafter submitted to an administrative
law judge (ALJ), who found that Mansoldo had made several
attempts to sell the property as "a parking lot ...or open space"-the
only uses permitted under the regulations-but that no one was
interested in purchasing the property. 2s 4 However, the ALJ
ultimately dismissed Mansoldo's appeal.285
Mansoldo thereafter filed suit, alleging that the "floodway
regulations resulted in an inverse condemnation of his property."286
The Appellate Division held that a taking had occurred but found
that Mansoldo was only entitled to the value of the property as
parkland, open space, or a parking lot, not as building lots.287 On
certification, then-Justice Zazzali, writing for the Court, reversed the
Appellate Division, finding-that it had incorrectly applied standing
precedents.28 Zazzali wrote that the issue was "whether the DEP
regulation denied all economically beneficial or productive use of the

277. See, e.g., Tightening 'Blight' in Eminent Domain, N.J.L.J., July 9,2007, at 18
(describing Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro,924 A.2d 447
(N.J. 2007), as "both legally sound and politically responsive").
278. 898 A.2d 1018 (N.J. 2006).
279. Id. at 1021.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1022.
287. Id. at 1023.
288. Id. at 1023-24.
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land."289 If the regulation does deny all economically beneficial use of
the land, then it is considered a taking and the state must provide
just compensation.290 Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter to
the trial court for further proceedings.291 The Mansoldo decision was
hailed as a "significant victory to private property owners whose
holdings plummet in value when new government regulations are
imposed."292
Almost one year to the date after Mansoldo, Chief Justice
Zazzali issued one of the most important eminent domain cases in
New Jersey jurisprudence. In Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v.
Borough of Paulsboro,293 the Court held that a statute allowing
"redevelopment of land that was in a stagnant condition did not
authorize [the Borough of Paulsboro] to redevelop property owners'
land simply because it was not fully productive."294 In Gallenthin, the
plaintiff owned a sixty-three-acre parcel of largely vacant
wetlands.295 In an effort to revitalize the area, Paulsboro classified
the subject property as "in need of redevelopment" under New Jersey
statute, maintaining that the property's unimproved condition made
it "not fully productive" and subject "to taking by eminent domain."296
Both of the lower courts upheld the borough's action and permitted
the taking.297
Writing for a unanimous Court, however, Chief Justice Zazzali
struck down the redevelopment designation, concluding that
Paulsboro's interpretation of its statutory authority violated the New
Jersey Constitution's blighted areas clause.298 The Chief reasoned
that:

289. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1025.
292. Robert G. Seidenstein, One for the Little Guy; Let Government Pay, N.J.
LAWYER, June 12, 2006, at 1.
Rejecting lower court rulings, the justices said when the government
regulates the value out of private property, it is expected to pay up as if it
were flat-out taking it. The high court delivered that message in a ruling that
could have had grave consequences for property owners had it gone the other
way. But the court made clear that government cannot walk away from the
financial losses triggered when government-ordered limits are placed on
properties.

Id.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

924 A.2d 447 (N.J. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 449.
Id. The statute in question was N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5(e) (West 2006).
Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 449.
Id. at 461-62. The clause provides:

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:4

[B]ecause we must presume that the Legislature intended
subsection (e) to function in a constitutional manner, and
because subsection (e) is reasonably susceptible to an
alternative interpretation, we conclude that the Legislature
intended [the statute] to apply only to property that has become
stagnant because of issues of title, diversity of ownership, or
other similar conditions.299
Focusing on the constitutional limitations on takings, the Chief then
concluded that "[tihe New Jersey Constitution does not permit
government redevelopment of private property solely because the
property is not used in an optimal manner."300
The decision in Gallenthin drew praise for its protection of
individual property owner rights, and had an immediate impact on
eminent domain in New Jersey. Indeed, within two months of
Gallenthin's filing, state appellate courts rejected redevelopment
projects in three New Jersey towns.31 As one commentator noted,
"The decision made one important, far reaching point: The courts in
New Jersey will not rubber-stamp either development-minded towns
or even the Legislatures, despite the deference given to them in the
past."302 The state's public advocate also praised the decision, stating,

"It's a pretty far-reaching [decision] that addresses a very, very real
issue in modern redevelopment-which is an overly expansive, bogus

The clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment of blighted areas
shall be a public purpose and public use, for which private property may be
taken or acquired. Municipal, public or private corporations may be
authorized by law to undertake such clearance, replanning, development or
redevelopment; and improvements made for these purposes and uses, or for
any of them, may be exempted from taxation, in whole or in part, for a
limited period of time ....The conditions of use, ownership, management
and control of such improvements shall be regulated by law.
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, 1.
299. Gallenthin,924 A.2d at 463.
300. Id. at 465.
301. In Gallenthin's immediate wake, New Jersey's Appellate Division began to
derail municipal redevelopment efforts. Kris W. Scibiorski & Robert G. Seidenstein,
Pullback on Eminent Domain Taking Hold, N.J. LAWYER, July 23, 2007, at 3.
Appellate panels, citing Gallenthin, found government takings to violate the New
Jersey Constitution in at least three municipalities: Belmar, Camden, and Lodi. See
id.; see also Erik Larsen, Appellate Court Tightens Blight Standards, ASBURY PARK
PRESS (Neptune, N.J.), July 25, 2007, at A7; Another Victory in "Blight"Fight, ASBURY
PARK PRESS (Neptune, N.J.), July 27, 2007, at A16. According to one attorney, "[c]ourts
are clearly taking a much closer look at the evidence provided by towns," a level of
scrutiny that may foreclose towns from merely "reiterate[ing] the language found in
the statute without [conducting] a detailed investigation." Scibiorski & Seidenstein,
supra.
302. Bob Braun, Caution, Development Ahead: 'Anything Goes' Becomes 'Not So
Fast' With Supreme Court's Decision on Eminent Domain, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), June 14, 2007, at 67.
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definition of blight. The court has made it quite clear it won't
countenance that expression of blight. It's a very important
statement."303
Finally, with respect to landlord-tenant jurisprudence, three of
the Chiefs opinions are worthy of treatment. In Miah v. Ahmed,304 a
unanimous court found that tenants who are evicted from their
apartment as a result of their landlord's citation for illegal occupancy
are entitled to relocation assistance under New Jersey law in an
amount equal to six times their rent-not simply to reimbursement
for their relocation expenses. 305 Although the Court's holding was
based on a plain reading of the statute, Justice Zazzali also found
policy justifications for the Court's holding, stating:
Although in some circumstances our interpretation will require
the landlord to pay more than the tenant's actual expenses,
that result is neither unreasonable nor inequitable. By
advertising a space as available for rent, it is the landlord that
is responsible for an illegal occupancy and for the corollary
threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the tenant and the
community at large.306
Chief Justice Zazzali also authored two notable decisions
concerning summary dispossess proceedings, in which the Court
provided protection to low-income tenants. In Housing Authority &
Urban Redevelopment Agency of Atlantic City v. Taylor,307 the Court
held that landlords may not recover attorneys' fees and late charges
as "additional rent" in summary dispossess proceedings.308 Five years
later, in Hodges v. Sasil Corp.,309 the Court held that a law firm that
regularly files summary dispossess actions for nonpayment of rent
may be a "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.310 In so holding, Justice Zazzali displayed the Court's concern for
protecting low-income tenants: "Application of the FDCPA to law
firms regularly engaged in summary dispossess actions furthers the
congressional objective underlying the statute - protection of

303. Kate Coscarelli, Court Limits Towns' Power to Seize Land: 'Underused'
Designation Deficient in S. Jersey Eminent Domain Case, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), June 14, 2007, at 1.
304. 846 A.2d 1244 (N.J. 2004).
305. Id. at 1252.
306. Id.
307. 796 A.2d 193 (N.J. 2002).
308. See id. at 202.
309. 915 A.2d 1 (N.J. 2007).
310. Id. at 3.
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consumers from debt collectors who coerce payment of debts and
additional charges."311
VI. CONCLUSION

Chief Justice Zazzali's career and tenure on the Court reveal a
dedication to public service and an unyielding sympathy for the
disadvantaged. His judicial opinions are recognized as clear, concise,
and unembellished,312 and his exceptional accomplishments are often
veiled by his approachability.33 His six years as an associate justice
on the Supreme Court of New Jersey and his brief tenure as the
judiciary's top judge epitomize a life-long dedication to justice and
service. One of New Jersey's most beloved public servants, James
Zazzali will undoubtedly be remembered as a model public servantuncompromising yet compassionate.
It is all too appropriate that Chief Justice Zazzali's seventieth
birthday fell on Sunday, June 17, 2007-Father's Day. On his
swearing in as Chief Justice, the always-humble public servant
noted, albeit incorrectly, that he would not be remembered for his
judicial opinions. Rather, pointing to his five children (and at the
time one grandchild), he noted that they would be his legacy.314 On
his swearing in as an associate justice, as noted, he referenced his
father's near appointment to a federal judgeship, commenting that
his own nomination to New Jersey's high court vindicated his father's
near miss.315 And, throughout his tenure on the bench, Chief Justice
Zazzali, as only a protective father could, doggedly championed the
rights of the underprivileged, the young, the downtrodden, and the
injured. He was indeed the guardian of the little guy. By taking care
of the Garden State's underdogs, Chief Justice Zazzali was more than
a caretaker.

311. Id. at 11. Although the director of Essex-Newark Legal Services hailed Justice
Zazzali's majority opinion as "a significant victory" for subsidized housing tenants, the
New Jersey Apartment Association opined that the ruling may unintentionally curtail
settlement of rent disputes. Rick Hepp, Justices Protect Federally Subsidized Tenants,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb..1, 2007, at 17.
312. See Gallagher, supra note 5.
313. See, e.g., Coscarelli, supra note 13.
314. Seidenstein, supra note 70.
315. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.

